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Abstract
Analysis of efficiency of outcomes in game theoretic settings has been a main item
of study at the intersection of economics and computer science. The notion of
the price of anarchy takes a worst-case stance to efficiency analysis, considering
instance independent guarantees of efficiency. We propose a data-dependent analog
of the price of anarchy that refines this worst-case assuming access to samples of
strategic behavior. We focus on auction settings, where the latter is non-trivial
due to the private information held by participants. Our approach to bounding the
efficiency from data is robust to statistical errors and mis-specification. Unlike
traditional econometrics, which seek to learn the private information of players
from observed behavior and then analyze properties of the outcome, we directly
quantify the inefficiency without going through the private information. We apply
our approach to datasets from a sponsored search auction system and find empirical
results that are a significant improvement over bounds from worst-case analysis.
1 Introduction
A major field at the intersection of economics and computer science is the analysis of the efficiency of
systems under strategic behavior. The seminal work of [6, 10] triggered a line of work on quantifying
the inefficiency of computer systems, ranging from network routing, resource allocation and more
recently auction marketplaces [9]. However, the notion of the price of anarchy suffers from the
pessimism of worst-case analysis. Many systems can be inefficient in the worst-case over parameters
of the model, but might perform very well for the parameters that arise in practice.
Due to the large availability of datasets in modern economic systems, we propose a data-dependent
analog of the price of anarchy, which assumes access to a sample of strategic behavior from the
system. We focus our analysis on auction systems where the latter approach is more interesting due
to the private information held by the participants of the system, i.e. their private value for the item at
sale. Since efficiency is a function of these private parameters, quantifying the inefficiency of the
system from samples of strategic behavior is non-trivial. The problem of estimation of the inefficiency
becomes an econometric problem where we want to estimate a function of hidden variables from
observed strategic behavior. The latter is feasible under the assumption that the observed behavior
is the outcome of an equilibrium of the strategic setting, which connects observed behavior to
unobserved private information.
Traditional econometric approaches to auctions [3, 8], address such questions by attempting to
exactly pin-point the private parameters from the observed behavior and subsequently measuring the
quantities of interest, such as the efficiency of the allocation. The latter approach is problematic in
complex auction systems for two main reasons: (i) it leads to statistical inefficiency, (ii) it requires
strong conditions on the connection between observed behavior and private information. Even for a
single-item first-price auction, uniform estimation of the private value of a player from T samples
of observed bids, can only be achieved at O(T 1/3)-rates [3]. Moreover, uniquely identifying the
private information from the observed behavior, requires a one-to-one mapping between the two
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quantities. The latter requires strong assumptions on the distribution of private parameters and can
only be applied to simple auction rules.
Our approach bridges the gap between worst-case price of anarchy analysis and statistically and
modeling-wise brittle econometric analysis. We provide a data-dependent analog of recent techniques
for quantifying the worst-case inefficiency in auctions [12, 4, 9], that do not require characterization
of the equilibrium structure and which directly quantify the inefficiency through best-response
arguments, without the need to pin-point the private information. Our approach makes minimal
assumptions on the distribution of private parameters and on the auction rule and achieves O˜(
√
T )-
rates of convergence for many auctions used in practice, such as the Generalized Second Price (GSP)
auction [2, 13]. We applied our approach to a real world dataset from a sponsored search auction
system and we portray the optimism of the data-dependent guarantees as compared to their worst-case
counterparts [1].
2 Preliminaries
We consider the single-dimensional mechanism design setting with n bidders. The mechanism
designer wants to allocate a unit of good to the bidders, subject to some feasibility constraint on
the vector of allocations (x1, . . . , xn). Let X be the space of feasible allocations. Each bidder i has
a private value vi ∈ [0, H] per-unit of the good, and her utility when she gets allocation xi and is
asked to make a payment pi is vi · xi − pi. The value of each bidder is drawn independently from
distribution with CDF Fi, supported in Vi ⊆ R+ and let F = ×i Fi be the joint distribution.
An auction A solicits a bid bi ∈ B from each bidder i and decides on the allocation vector based on
an allocation rule X : Bn → X and a payment rule p : Bn → Rn. For a vector of values and bids,
the utility of a bidder is:
Ui(b; vi) = vi ·Xi(b)− Pi(b). (1)
A strategy σi : Vi → B, for each bidder i, maps the value of the bidder to a bid. Given an auction A
and distribution of values F, a strategy profile σ is a Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (BNE) if each bidder
i with any value vi ∈ Vi maximizes her utility in expectation over her opponents bids, by bidding
σi(vi).
The welfare of an auction outcome is the expected utility generated for all the bidders, plus the
revenue of the auctioneer, which due to the form of bidder utilities boils down to being the total value
that the bidders get from the allocation. Thus the expected utility of a strategy profile σ is
WELFARE(σ;F) = Ev∼F
∑
i∈[n]
vi ·Xi(σ(v))
 (2)
We denote with OPT(F) the expected optimal welfare: OPT(F) = Ev∼F[maxx∈X
∑
i∈[n] vi · xi].
Worst-case Bayes-Nash price of anarchy. The Bayesian price of anarchy of an auction is defined
as the worst-case ratio of welfare in the optimal auction to the welfare in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
of the original auction, taken over all value distributions and over all equilibria. Let BNE(A,F) be
the set of Bayes-Nash equilibria of an auction A, when values are drawn from distributions F. Then:
POA = sup
F,σ∈BNE(F)
OPT(F)
WELFARE(σ;F)
(3)
3 Distributional Price of Anarchy: Refining the POA with Data
We will assume that we observe T samples b1:T = {b1, . . . ,bT } of bid profiles from running T
times an auction A. Each bid profile bt is drawn i.i.d. based on an unknown Bayes-Nash equilibrium
σ of the auction, i.e.: let D denote the distribution of the random variable σ(v), when v is drawn
from F. Then bt are i.i.d. samples from D. Our goal is to refine our prediction on the efficiency of the
auction and compute a bound on the price of anarchy of the auction conditional on the observed data
set. More formally, we want to derive statements of the form: conditional on b1:T , with probability
at least 1 − δ: WELFARE(σ;F) ≥ 1ρˆOPT(F), where ρˆ is the empirical analogue of the worst-case
price of anarchy ratio.
2
Infinite data limit We will tackle this question in two steps, as is standard in estimation theory.
First we will look at the infinite data limit where we know the actual distribution of equilibrium bids
D. We define a notion of price of anarchy that is tailored to an equilibrium bid distribution, which we
refer to as the distributional price of anarchy. In Section 4 we give a distribution-dependent upper
bound on this ratio for any single-dimensional auction. Subsequently, in Section 5, we show how one
can estimate this upper bound on the distributional price of anarchy from samples.
Given a value distribution F and an equilibrium σ, let D(F, σ) denote the resulting equilibrium bid
distribution. We then define the distributional price of anarchy as follows:
Definition 1 (Distributional Price of Anarchy). The distributional price of anarchy DPOA(D) of
an auction A and a distribution of bid profiles D, is the worst-case ratio of welfare in the optimal
allocation to the welfare in an equilibrium, taken over all distributions of values and all equilibria
that could generate the bid distribution D:
DPOA(D) = sup
F,σ∈BNE(F) s.t. D(F,σ)=D
OPT(F)
WELFARE(σ;F)
(4)
This notion has nothing to do with sampled data-sets, but rather is a hypothetical worst-case quantity
that we could calculate had we known the true bid generating distribution D.
What does the extra information of knowing D give us? To answer this question, we first focus
on the optimization problem each bidder faces. At any Bayes-Nash equilibrium each player must
be best-responding in expectation over his opponent bids. Observe that if we know the rules of the
auction and the equilibrium distribution of bids D, then the expected allocation and payment function
of a player as a function of his bid are uniquely determined:
xi(b;D) = Eb−i∼D−i [Xi(b,b−i)] pi(b;D) = Eb−i∼D−i [Pi(b,b−i)] . (5)
Importantly, these functions do not depend on the distribution of values F, other than through the
distribution of bids D. Moreover, the expected revenue of the auction is also uniquely determined:
REV(D) = Eb∼D
[∑
i
Pi(b)
]
, (6)
Thus when bounding the distributional price of anarchy, we can assume that these functions and
the expected revenue are known. The latter is unlike the standard price of anarchy analysis, which
essentially needs to take a worst-case approach to these quantities.
Shorthand notation Through the rest of the paper we will fix the distributionD. Hence, for brevity
we omit it from notation, using xi(b), pi(b) and REV instead of xi(b;D), pi(b;D) and REV(D).
4 Bounding the Distributional Price of Anarchy
We first upper bound the distributional price of anarchy via a quantity that is relatively easy to
calculate as a function of the bid distribution D and hence will also be rather straightforward to
estimate from samples of D, which we defer to the next section. To give intuition about the upper
bound, we start with a simple but relevant example of bounding the distributional price of anarchy in
the case when the auction A is the single-item first price auction. We then generalize the approach to
any auction A.
4.1 Example: Single-Item First Price Auction
In a single item first price auction, the designer wants to auction a single indivisible good. Thus
the space of feasible allocations X , are ones where only one player gets allocation xi = 1 and
other players get allocation 0. The auctioneer solicits bids bi from each bidder and allocates the
good to the highest bidder (breaking ties lexicographically), charging him his bid. Let D be the
equilibrium distribution of bids and let Gi be the CDF of the bid of player i. For simplicity we
assume that Gi is continuous (i.e. the distribution is atomless). Then the expected allocation of a
player i from submitting a bid b is equal to xi(b) = G−i(b) =
∏
j 6=iGj(b) and his expected payment
is pi(b) = b · xi(b), leading to expected utility: ui(b; vi) = (vi − b)G−i(b).
3
The quantity DPOA is a complex object as it involves the structure of the set of equilibria of the given
auction. The set of equilibria of a first price auction when bidders values are drawn from different
distributions is an horrific object.1 However, we can upper bound this quantity by a much simpler
data-dependent quantity by simply invoking the fact that under any equilibrium bid distribution no
player wants to deviate from his equilibrium bid. Moreover, this data-dependent quantity can be
much better than its worst-case counterpart used in the existing literature on the price of anarchy.
Lemma 1. Let A be the single item first price auction and let D be the equilibrium distribution of
bids, then DPOA(D) ≤ µ(D)
1−e−µ(D) , where µ(D) =
maxi∈[n] Eb−i∼D−i [maxj 6=i bj ]
Eb∼D[maxi∈[n] bi]
.
Proof. Let Gi be the CDF of the bid of each player under distribution D. Moreover, let σ denote the
equilibrium strategy that leads to distribution D. By the equilibrium condition, we know that for all
vi ∈ Vi and for all b′ ∈ B,
ui(σi(vi); vi) ≥ ui(b′; vi) = (vi − b′) ·G−i(b′). (7)
We will give a special deviating strategy used in the literature [12], that will show that either the
players equilibrium utility is large or the expected maximum other bid is high. Let Ti denote the
expected maximum other bid which can be expressed as Ti =
∫∞
0
1−G−i(z)dz. We consider the
randomized deviation where the player submits a randomized bid in z ∈ [0, vi(1− e−µ)] with PDF
f(z) = 1µ(vi−z) . Then the expected utility from this deviation is:
E
b′
[ui(b
′; vi)] =
∫ vi(1−e−µ)
0
(vi − z) ·G−i(z)f(z)dz = 1
µ
∫ vi(1−e−µ)
0
G−i(z)dz (8)
Adding the quantity 1µ
∫ vi(1−e−µ)
0
(1−G−i(z))dz ≤ Ti on both sides, we get: Eb′ [ui(b′; vi)]+ 1µTi ≥
vi (1− e−µ). Invoking the equilibrium condition we get: ui(σi(vi); vi) + 1µTi ≥ vi (1− e−µ).
Subsequently, for any x∗i ∈ [0, 1]:
ui(σi(vi); vi) +
1
µ
Ti · x∗i ≥ vi · x∗i
(
1− e−µ) . (9)
If x∗i is the expected allocation of player i under the efficient allocation rule X
∗
i (v) ≡ 1{vi =
maxj vj}, then taking expectation of Equation (9) over vi and adding across all players we get:
∑
i
E
vi
[ui(σi(vi); vi)] +
1
µ
E
v
[∑
i
TiX
∗
i (v)
]
≥ OPT(F) (1− e−µ) (10)
The theorem then follows by invoking the fact that for any feasible allocation x:
∑
i Ti · xi ≤
maxi Ti = µ(D)REV(D), using the fact that expected total agent utility plus total revenue at
equilibrium is equal to expected welfare at equilibrium and setting µ = µ(D).
Comparison with worst-case POA In the worst-case, µ(D) is upper bounded by 1, leading to the
well-known worst-case price of anarchy ratio of the single-item first price auction of (1− 1/e)−1,
irrespective of the bid distribution D. However, if we know the distribution D then we can explicitly
estimate µ, which can lead to a much better ratio (see Figure 2 in Appendix). Moreover, observe that
even if we had samples from the bid distributionD, then estimating µ(D) is very easy as it corresponds
to the ratio of two expectations, each of which can be estimating to within an O( 1√
T
) error by a
simple average and using standard concentration inequalities. Even thought this improvement, when
compared to the worst-case bound might not be that drastic in the first price auction, the extension of
the analysis in the next section will be applicable even to auctions where the analogue of the quantity
µ(D) is not even bounded in the worst-case. In those settings, the empirical version of the price of
anarchy analysis is of crucial importance to get any efficiency bound.
1Even for two bidders with uniformly distributed values U [0, a] and U [0, b], the equilibrium strategy requires
solving a complex system of partial differential equations, which took several years of research in economics to
solve (see [14, 7])
4
Comparison with value inversion approach Apart from being just a primer to our main general
result in the next section, the latter result about the data-dependent efficiency bound for the first price
auction, is itself a contribution to the literature. It is notable to compare the latter result with the
standard econometric approach to estimating values in a first price auction pioneered by [3] (see also
[8]). Traditional non-parametric auction econometrics use the equilibrium best response condition
to pin-point the value of a player from his observed bid, by what is known as value inversion. In
particular, if the function: ui(b′; vi) = (vi − b′) · G−i(b′) has a unique maximum for each vi and
this maximum is strictly monotone in vi, then given the equilibrium bid of a player bi and given a
data distribution D we can reverse engineer the value vi(bi) that the player must have. Thus if we
know the bid distribution D we can calculate the equilibrium welfare as Eb∼D [
∑
i vi(bi) ·Xi(b)].
Moreover, we can calculate the expected optimal welfare as: Eb∼D [maxi vi(bi)]. Thus we can
pin-point the distributional price of anarchy.
However, the latter approach suffers from two main drawbacks: (i) estimating the value inversion
function vi(·) uniformly over b from samples, can only happen at very slow rates that are at least
O(1/T 1/3) and which require differentiability assumptions from the value and bid distribution as
well as strong conditions that the density of the value distribution is bounded away from zero in all the
support (with this lower bound constant entering the rates of convergence), (ii) the main assumption
of the latter approach is that the optimal bid is an invertible function and that given a bid there is
a single value that corresponds to that bid. This assumption might be slightly benign in a single
item first price auction, but becomes a harsher assumption when one goes to more complex auction
schemes. Our result in Lemma 1 suffers neither of these drawbacks: it admits fast estimation rates
from samples, makes no assumption on properties of the value and bid distribution and does not
require invertibility of the best-response correspondence. Hence it provides an upper bound on the
distributional price of anarchy that is statistically robust to both sampling and mis-specification errors.
4.2 Generalizing to any Single-Dimensional Auction Setting
Our analysis on DPOA is based on the reformulation of the auction rules as an equivalent pay-your-
bid auction and then bounding the price of anarchy as a function of the ratio of how much a player
needs to pay in an equivalent pay-your-bid auction, so as to acquire his optimal allocation vs. how
much revenue is the auctioneer collecting. For any auction, we can re-write the expected utility of a
bid b:
ui(b; vi) = xi(b)
(
vi − pi(b)
xi(b)
)
(11)
This can be viewed as the same form of utility if the auction was a pay-your-bid auction and the player
submitted a bid of pi(b)xi(b) . We refer to this term as the price-per-unit and denote it ppu(b) =
pi(b)
xi(b)
.
Our analysis will be based on the price-per-unit allocation rule x˜(·), which determines the expected
allocation of a player as a function of his price-per-unit. Given this notation, we can re-write
the utility that an agent achieves if he submits a bid that corresponds to a price-per-unit of z as:
u˜i(z; vi) = x˜(z)(vi − z). The latter is exactly the form of a pay-your-bid auction.
Our upper bound on the DPOA, will be based on the inverse of the PPU allocation rule; let τi(z) =
x˜−1i (z) be the price-per-unit of the cheapest bid that achieves allocation at least z. More formally,
τi(z) = minb|xi(b)≥z{ppu(b)}. For simplicity, we assume that any allocation z ∈ [0, 1] is achieveable
by some high enough bid b.2 Given this we can define the threshold for an allocation:
Definition 2 (Average Threshold). The average threshold for agent i is
Ti =
∫ 1
0
τi(z) dz (12)
In the Appendix we provide a pictorial representation of these quantities. Connecting with the
previous section, for a first price auction, the price-per-unit function is ppu(b) = b, the price-per-unit
allocation function is x˜i(b) = G−i(b) and the threshold function is τi(z) = G−1−i (z). The average
threshold Ti is equal to
∫ 1
0
G−1−i (z)dz =
∫∞
0
1−G−i(b)db, i.e. the expected maximum other bid.
2The theory can be easily extended to allow for different maximum achievable allocations by each player, by
simply integrating the average threshold only up until the largest such allocation.
5
We now give our main Theorem, which is a distribution-dependent bound on DPOA, that is easy
to compute give D and which can be easily estimated from samples of D. This theorem is a
generalization of Lemma 1 in the previous section.
Theorem 2 (Distributional Price of Anarchy Bound). For any auction A in a single dimensional
setting and for any bid distribution D, the distributional price of anarchy is bounded by DPOA(D) ≤
µ(D)
1−e−µ(D) , where µ(D) =
maxx∈X
∑n
i=1 Ti·xi
REV(D) .
Theorem 2 provides our main method for bounding the distributional price of anarchy. All we need is
to compute the revenue REV of the auction and the quantity:
T = maxx∈X
∑n
i=1 Ti · xi, (13)
under the given bid distribution D. Both of these are uniquely defined quantities if we are given
D. Moreover, once we compute Ti, the optimization problem in Equation (13) is simply a welfare
maximization problem, where each player’s value per-unit of the good is Ti. Thus, the latter can be
solved in polynomial time, whenever the welfare maximization problem over the feasible set X is
polynomial-time solvable.
Theorem 2 can be viewed as a bid distribution-dependent analogue of the revenue covering framework
[4] and of the smooth mechanism framework [12]. In particular, the quantity µ(D) is the data-
depenent analogue of the worst-case µ quantity used in the definition of µ-revenue covering in [4]
and is roughly related to the µ quantity used in the definition of a (λ, µ)-smooth mechanism in [12].
5 Distributional Price of Anarchy Bound from Samples
In the last section, we assumed we were given distribution D and hence we could compute the
quantity µ = TREV , which gave an upper bound on the DPOA. We now show how we can estimate this
quantity µ when given access to i.i.d. samples b1:T from the bid distribution D. We will separately
estimate T and REV. The latter is simple expectation and thereby can be easily estimated by an
average at 1√
T
rates. For the former we first need to estimate Ti for each player i, which requires
estimation of the allocation and payment functions xi(·;D) and pi(·;D).
Since both of these functions are expected values over the equilibrium bids of opponents, we will
approximate them by their empirical analogues:
x̂i(b) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Xi(b,b
t
−i) p̂i(b) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Pi(b,b
t
−i). (14)
To bound the estimation error of the quantities Tˆi produced by using the latter empirical estimates of
the allocation and payment function, we need to provide a uniform convergence property for the error
of these functions over the bid b.
Since b takes values in a continuous interval, we cannot simply apply a union bound. We need
to make assumptions on the structure of the class of functions FXi = {Xi(b, ·) : b ∈ B} andFPi = {Pi(b, ·) : b ∈ B}, so as uniformly bound their estimation error. For this we resort to the
technology of Rademacher complexity. For a generic class of functions F and a sequence of random
variables Z1:T , the Rademacher complexity is defined as:
RT (F , Z1:T ) = E
σ1:T
[
sup
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
σtf(Zt)
]
. (15)
where each σt ∈ {±1/2} is an i.i.d. Rademacher random variable, which takes each of those values
with equal probabilities. The following well known theorem will be useful in our derivations:
Theorem 3 ([11]). Suppose that for any sample Z1:T of size T ,RT (F , Z1:T ) ≤ RT and suppose
that functions in F take values in [0, H]. Then with probability 1− δ:
sup
f∈F
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
f(Zt)− E[f(Z)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2RT +H
√
2 log(4/δ)
T
(16)
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This Theorem reduces our uniform error problem to bounding the Rademacher complexity of classes
FXi and FPi , since we immediately have the following corollary (where we also use that the
allocation functions lie in [0, 1] and the payment functions lie in [0, H]):
Corollary 4. Suppose that for any sample b1:T of size T , the Rademacher complexity of classes FXi
andFPi is at mostRT . Then with probability 1−δ/2, both sup
b∈B
|x̂i(b)−xi(b)| and sup
b∈B
|p̂i(b)−pi(b)|
are at most 2RT +H
√
2 log(4/δ) / T .
We now provide conditions under which the Rademacher complexity of these classes is O˜(1/
√
T ).
Lemma 5. Suppose that B = [0, B] and for each bidder i and each bi ∈ B, the functions Xi(b, ·) :
[0, B]n−1 7→ [0, 1] and Pi(b, ·) : [0, B]n−1 7→ [0, H] can be computed as finite superposition
of (i) multiplication of bid vectors b−i with constants; (ii) comparison indicators 1{· > ·}; (iii)
pairwise addition · + ·. The Rademacher complexity for both classes on a sample of size T is
O
(√
log(T ) / T
)
.
The proof of this Lemma follows by standard arguments of Rademacher calculus, together with VC
arguments on the class of pairwise comparisons. Those arguments can be found in Lemma 9.9 in
[5]. Thereby, we omit its proof. The assumptions of Lemma 5 can be directly verified, for instance,
for the sponsored search auctions where the constants that multiply each bid correspond to quality
factors of the bidders, e.g. as in [2] and [13] and then the allocation and the payment is a function of
the rank of the weighted bid of a player. In that case the price and the allocation rule are determined
solely by the ranks and the values of the score-weighted bids γibi, as well as the position specific
quality factors αj , for each position j in the auction.
Next we turn to the analysis of the estimation errors on quantities Ti. We consider the following plug-
in estimator for Ti: We consider the empirical analog of function τi(·) by τ̂i(z) = inf
b∈[0,B], x̂i(b)≥z
p̂i(b)
x̂i(b)
.
Then the empirical analog of Ti is obtained by:
T̂i =
1∫
0
τ̂i(z) dz. (17)
To bound the estimation error of T̂i, we need to impose an additional condition that ensures that any
non-zero allocation requires the payment from the bidder at least proportional to that allocation.
Assumption 6. We assume that pi(x−1i (·)) is Lipschitz-continuous and that the mechanism is worst-
case interim individually rational, i.e. pi(b) ≤ H · xi(b).
Under this assumption we can establish that O˜(
√
T ) rates of convergence of T̂i to Ti and of the
empirical analog Tˆ = maxx∈X
∑n
i=1 Tˆi · xi of the optimized threshold to T as well as the empirical
analog R̂EV of the revenue to REV. Thus the quantity µˆ = Tˆ
R̂EV
, will also converge to µ = TREV at
that rate. This implies the following final conclusion of this section.
Theorem 7. Under Assumption 6 and the premises of Lemma 5, with probability 1− δ:
OPT(F)
WELFARE(σ;F)
≤ µ̂
1− e−µ̂ + O˜
(
nmax{L,H}
√
H log(n/δ)
T
)
(18)
6 Sponsored Search Auction: Model, Methodology and Data Analysis
We consider a position auction setting where k ordered positions are assigned to n bidders. An
outcome m in a position auction is an allocation of positions to bidders. m(j) denotes the bidder who
is allocated position j; m−1(i) refers to the position assigned to bidder i. When bidder i is assigned to
slot j, the probability of click ci,j is the product of the click-through-rate of the slot αj and the quality
score of the bidder, γi, so ci,j = αjγi (in the data the quality scores for each bidder are varying across
different auctions and we used the average score as a proxy for the score of a bidder). Each advertiser
has a value-per-click (VPC) vi, which is not observed in the data and which we assume is drawn from
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some distribution Fi. Our benchmark for welfare will be the welfare of the auction that chooses a
feasible allocation to maximize the welfare generated, thus OPT = Ev[maxm
∑
i γiαm−1(i)vi].
We consider data generated by advertisers repeatedly participating in a sponsored search auction. The
mechanism that is being repeated at each stage is an instance of a generalized second price auction
triggered by a search query. The rules of each auction are as follows: Each advertiser i is associated
with a click probability γi and a scoring coefficient si and is asked to submit a bid-per-click bi.
Advertisers are ranked by their rank-score qi = si · bi and allocated positions in decreasing order
of rank-score as long as they pass a rank-score reserve r. All the mentioned sets of parameters
θ = (s, α, γ, r) and the bids b are observable in the data.
We will denote with pib,θ(j) the bidder allocated in slot j under a bid profile b and parameter profile
θ. We denote with pi−1b,θ(i) the slot allocated to bidder i. If advertiser i is allocated position j,
then he pays only when he is clicked and his payment, i.e. his cost-per-click is the minimal bid
he had to place to keep his position, which is: cpcij(b; θ) =
max
{
spib,θ(j+1)·bpib,θ(j+1),r
}
si
. Mapping
this setting to our general model, the allocation function of the auction is Xi(b) = αpi−1b,θ(i) · γ,
the payment function is Pi(b) = αpi−1b,θ(i) · γ · cpcipi−1b,θ(i)(b; θ) and the utility function is:
Ui(b; vi) = αpi−1b,θ(i)
· γi ·
(
vi − cpcipi−1b,θ(i)(b; θ)
)
.
Data Analysis We applied our analysis to the BingAds sponsored search auction system. We
analyzed eleven phrases from multiple thematic categories. For each phrase we retrieved data of
auctions for the phrase for the period of a week. For each phrase and bidder that participated in the
auctions for the phrase we computed the allocation curve by simulating the auctions for the week
under any alternative bid an advertiser could submit (bids are multiples of cents).
µˆ = Tˆ
R̂EV
1
DPOA =
1−e−µˆ
µˆ
phrase1 .511 .783
phrase2 .509 .784
phrase3 2.966 .320
phrase4 1.556 .507
phrase5 .386 .829
phrase6 .488 .791
phrase7 .459 .802
phrase8 .419 .817
phrase9 .441 .809
phrase10 .377 .833
phrase11 .502 .786
Figure 1: (left) Examples of price-per-unit allocation curves for a subset of six advertisers for a specific keyword
during the period of a week. All axes are normalized to 1 for privacy reasons. (right) Distributional Price of
Anarchy analysis for a set of eleven search phrases on the BingAds system.
See Figure 1 for the price-per-unit allocation curves x˜i(·) = τ−1i (·) for a subset of the advertisers
for a specific search phrase. We estimated the average threshold Tˆi for each bidder by numerically
integrating these allocation curves along the y axis. We then applied the approach described in
Section 3 for each of the search phrases, computing the quantity Tˆ = maxx∈X
∑
i∈[n] Tˆi · xi =
maxm(·)
∑
i Tˆi · γi · αm−1(i). The latter optimization is simply the optimal assignment problem
where each player’s value-per-click is Tˆi and can be performed by greedily assigning players to slots
in decreasing order of Tˆi. We then estimate the expected revenue by the empirical revenue R̂EV.
We portray our results on the estimate µˆ = Tˆ
R̂EV
and the implied bound on the distributional price
of anarchy for each of the eleven search phrases in Table 1. Phrases are grouped based on thematic
category. Even though the worst-case price of anarchy of this auction is unbounded (since scores
si are not equal to qualities γi, which is required in worst-case POA proofs [1]), we observe that
empirically the price of anarchy is very good and on average the guarantee is approximately 80% of
the optimal. Even if si = γi the worst-case bound on the POA implies guarantees of approx. 34%
8
[1], while the DPOA we estimated implies significantly higher percentages, portraying the value of
the empirical approach we propose.
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A.1 Distributional Price of Anarchy as a Function of µ(D)
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Figure 2: The upper bound on the distributional price of anarchy of an auction µ(D)
1−e−µ(D as a function of µ(D).
A.2 Pictorial Representation of Threshold Functions
1
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x˜i(ppu) = τ−1i (ppu)
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Figure 3: For any bid b with PPC ppu(b), the area
of a rectangle between (ppu(b), x˜i(ppu(b))) and
(vi, 0) on the bid allocation rule is the expected
utility ui(b). The BNE action b∗ is chosen to max-
imize this area.
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x˜(ppu)
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Figure 4: The average threshold is the area to the
left of the price-per-unit allocation rule, integrate
from 0 to 1.
B Omitted Proofs from Section 3
Theorem 2 (restatement) For any auction A in a single dimensional setting and for any bid dis-
tribution D, the distributional price of anarchy is bounded by DPOA(D) ≤ µ(D)
1−e−µ(D) , where
µ(D) = maxx∈X
∑n
i=1 Ti·xi
REV(D) .
Proof. Our proof is a based on a data-dependent analog of the value and revenue covering framework
of [4]. First we show that even without having distributional knowledge, the threshold functions are
related to the equilibrium utility of a bidder and any target utility at any Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Specifically, either the utility of a bidder at a Bayes-Nash is high compared to his value or the average
threshold Ti is high.
1
Lemma 8 (Value Covering). For any bidder i with value vi, for any allocation amount x ∈ [0, 1]
and for any µ ≥ 1,
ui(vi) +
1
µ
Ti · xi ≥ 1− e
−µ
µ
vi · xi. (19)
where ui(vi) = ui(σi(vi); vi).
Proof. The proof proceeds analogously to the proof of value covering in [4]. For simplicity of
notation we drop the subscript i, as we are focusing on a single agent and some threshold function
τ(·). Observe that since a player is at equilibrium it must be that for any target expected allocation z
he does not want to deviate to a bid that corresponds to a price-per-unit ppu(b) = τ(z), which would
yield him expected allocation at least z:
u(v) ≥ z · (v − τ(z)) =⇒ τ(z) ≥ v − u(v)
z
(20)
Moreover, in any case τ(z) ≥ 0, by definition. Thus if we define τ(z) = max(0, v − u(v)/z), then
we have τ(z) ≥ τ(z) and hence T ≥ T = ∫ 1
0
τ(z)dz.
Evaluating the integral gives T = v − u(v) + u(v) log u(v)v . Thus
u(v) +
1
µ
T = u(v) +
1
µ
(
v − u(v) + u(v) log u(v)
v
)
and by dividing over by v:
u(v) + 1µT
v
=
u(v)
v
+
1
µ
(
1− u(v)
v
+
u(v)
v
log
u(v)
v
)
(21)
The right side of Equation (21) is convex in u(v)v , so we can minimize it by taking first-order
conditions of the quantity y + 1µ (1− y + y log y) with respect to variable y, giving
0 = 1 +
1
µ
log y =⇒ y = e−µ.
Leading to a minimum value of that quantity of 1−e
−µ
µ . Thus the right side of Equation (21) is at
least this quantity, giving our desired result,
u(v) + 1µT
v
≥ 1− e
−µ
µ
.
The Lemma follows by the fact that T ≥ T and x ∈ [0, 1], which allows us to multiply and divide the
fraction by x and then remove the x in front of the quantity u(v).
Given the value covering lemma we now proceed to proving the Theorem. Let X∗(v) be the welfare
optimal allocation rule for valuation profile v, i.e. the one that solves the optimization problem
maxx∈X
∑n
i=1 vi · xi. Applying the value covering inequality of Equation (19) with respect to the
optimal allocation quantity X∗i (v) gives that for each bidder i with value vi,
ui(vi) +
1
µ
Ti ·X∗i (v) ≥
1− e−µ
µ
vi ·X∗i (v). (22)
The quantity vi ·X∗i (v) is exactly agent i’s expected contribution to the welfare of the optimal auction.
Moreover, by the definition of µ(D):
µ(D) · REV ≥ max
x∈X
n∑
i=1
Ti · xi ≥ Ev
[∑
i
Ti ·X∗i (v)
]
(23)
2
Let UTIL denote the expected equilibrium total utility of the bidders in the auction. By Equations
(22) and (23) we obtain:
UTIL + REV ≥ Ev
[∑
i
ui(vi)
]
+Ev
[∑
i
1
µ(D)Ti ·X
∗
i (v)
]
=
∑
i
Ev
[
ui(vi) +
1
µ(D)Ti ·X
∗
i (v)
]
≥
∑
i
Ev
[
1− e−µ(D)
µ(D) vi ·X
∗
i (v)
]
=
1− e−µ(D)
µ(D) OPT(F)
Since WELFARE(σ;F) = UTIL + REV, we have our desired result:
WELFARE(σ;F) ≥ 1− e
−µ(D)
µ(D) OPT(F).
C Omitted Proofs from Section 5
We begin by showing convergence of Tˆi to Ti and Tˆ to T.
Lemma 9 (Bounding Estimated Average Thresholds). Suppose that the premises of Lemma 5 hold
and that the function pi(x−1i (·)) is L-Lipschitz continuous. Then for each player i with probability
1− δ:
|T̂i − Ti| ≤ O˜
(
max{L,H}
√
H log(1/δ)
T
)
(24)
Proof. Since we focus on a single player i, we drop index i and denote τ(·), p(·), x(·) for
τi(·), pi(·), xi(·) and similarly for their estimated quantities. Recall that τ(z) = infx(b)≥z p(b)x(b) and
τ̂(z) = inf x̂(b)≥z
p̂(b)
x̂(b) . Moreover, we denote with x = sup
b∈B
|x̂(b)−x(b)| and p = sup
b∈B
|p̂(b)−p(b)|,
the uniform errors on the payment and allocation curve, which be the assumptions of the theorem are
upper bounded, with probability 1− δ, by O˜
(√
H log(1/δ)
T
)
.
Our goal is to bound the quantity:
|Tˆi − Ti| =
∣∣∣∣∫ 1
0
(τˆ(z)− τ(z))dz
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫ 1
0
|τˆ(z)− τ(z)|dz
By individual rationality we have that p(b) ≤ Hx(b). Thus we get that 0 ≤ τ(z), τˆ(z) ≤ H and
therefore |τˆ(z)− τ(z)| ≤ H . Hence:
|Tˆi − Ti| ≤
∫ 2x
0
|τ̂(z)− τ(z)| dz +
∫ 1
2x
|τ̂(z)− τ(z)| dz ≤ 2Hx +
∫ 1
2x
|τ̂(z)− τ(z)| dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
It remains to bound quantity A. We consider any z ∈ [2x, 1]. By the definition of τ and τˆ , we obtain
|τ̂(z)− τ(z)| =
∣∣∣∣ infx̂(b)≥z p̂(b)x̂(b) − infx(b)≥z p(b)x(b)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ infx̂(b)≥z p̂(b)x̂(b) − infx̂(b)≥z p(b)x(b)
∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
+
∣∣∣∣ infx̂(b)≥z p(b)x(b) − infx(b)≥z p(b)x(b)
∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
.
We now upper bound separately the two terms C and D.
3
Bounding C. For term C we have:
C ≤ sup
x̂(b)≥z
∣∣∣∣ p̂(b)x̂(b) − p(b)x(b)
∣∣∣∣ = sup
x̂(b)≥z
1
x̂(b)x(b)
· |p̂(b)x(b)− p(b) · x̂(b)|
= sup
x̂(b)≥z
1
x̂(b)x(b)
· |p̂(b)x(b)− p(b)x(b) + p(b)x(b)− p(b) · x̂(b)|
≤ sup
x̂(b)≥z
1
x̂(b)
· |p(b)− p̂(b)|+ sup
x̂(b)≥z
p(b)
x̂(b)x(b)
· |x(b)− x̂(b)|
≤ 1
z
p +
1
z
sup
x̂(b)≥z
p(b)
x(b)
· |x(b)− x̂(b)|
Since z ≥ 2x, we have that for any b, with xˆ(b) ≥ z, it must also be that: x(b) ≥ xˆ(b) − x ≥
z − x > 0, which implies that p(b)x(b) ≤ H (by individual rationality). Which leads to the bound:
C ≤ 1
z
p +
H
z
x (25)
Bounding D. For quantity D, we proceed as follows. Let Z = {x(b) : x(b) ≥ z} and Zˆ = {x(b) :
xˆ(b) ≥ z} (note that in the second set, we still use x(b) to define the possible allocations, and only
the set of bids is defined based on the estimated allocation function). Then:
D =
∣∣∣∣ infx̂(b)≥z p(b)x(b) − infx(b)≥z p(b)x(b)
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ inf
t∈Zˆ
p(x−1(t))
t
− inf
t∈Z
p(x−1(t))
t
∣∣∣∣ ,
By the fact that the function p(x−1(t)) is L-Lipschitz, we can bound the derivative of the function
Q(t) = p(x
−1(t))
t by:
|Q′(t)| =
∣∣∣∣ (p(x−1(t))′t − p(x−1(t))t2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2max{Lt , p(x−1(t))t2
}
Observe that p(x−1(t)) is the expected payment required to get an expected allocation of t. By
individual rationality, for any t > 0, the latter is at most H · t. Thus:
|Q′(t)| ≤ 2max{L,H}
t
(26)
Observe that for any t ∈ Z ∪ Zˆ, t ≥ z − x ≥ z2 > 0. Hence, the function Q(t) is 4max{L,H}z -
Lipschitz in Z ∪ Zˆ. Moreover, observe that for any tˆ ∈ Zˆ, there exists t ∈ Z: |t− tˆ| ≤ x. Hence,
the two infima in expression D can defer by at most:
D ≤ 4max{L,H}
z
x (27)
Concluding. Thus we can bound quantity A by:
A ≤
∫ 1
2x
p + 5max{L,H}x
z
dz ≤ log
(
1
2x
)
(p + 5max{L,H}x)
Combining all the above, we conclude that:
|Tˆi − Ti| ≤ 2Hx + log
(
1
2x
)
(p + 5max{L,H}x) (28)
Since with probability 1 − δ, both x and p are of O˜
(√
H log(1/δ)
T
)
, we get that with the same
probability:
|Tˆi − Ti| ≤ O˜
(
max{L,H}
√
H log(1/δ)
T
)
(29)
since the quantity log(1/x), can only introduce log(T ) factors in the RHS of Equation (28).
4
Lemma 10 (Bounding Estimated Optimal Threshold Quantity). Let Tˆ = maxx∈X
∑n
i=1 Tˆi · xi.
Then with probability 1− δ:
|Tˆ−T| ≤ O˜
(
nmax{L,H}
√
H log(n/δ)
T
)
(30)
Proof. By Lemma 9 and a union bound across players, we have that with probability 1− δ:
sup
i∈[n]
|Tˆi − Ti| ≤ O˜
(
max{L,H}
√
H log(n/δ)
T
)
(31)
Moreover, for any allocation x ∈ X :∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
(T̂i − Ti)xi
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤∑
i
|T̂i − Ti| ≤ O˜
(
nmax{L,H}
√
H log(n/δ)
T
)
(32)
Thus we can bound the error in T as:∣∣∣T̂−T∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣maxx∈X
∑
i
(T̂i · xi −max
x∈X
∑
i∈[n]
Tixi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ supx∈X
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
(T̂i − Ti)xi
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ O˜
(
nmax{L,H}
√
H log(n/δ)
T
)
The latter concludes the proof of the theorem.
We are now ready to show our main estimation theorem.
Theorem 7 (Restatement). Under Assumption 6 and the premises of Lemma 5, with probability
1− δ:
OPT(F)
WELFARE(σ;F)
≤ µ̂
1− e−µ̂ + O˜
(
nmax{L,H}
√
H log(n/δ)
T
)
(33)
Proof. First note that R̂EV = 1T
∑T
t=1 b
i:T . Thus, using standard Hoeffding’s inequality we obtain
that
P
(∣∣∣R̂EV − REV∣∣∣ > τ) ≤ 2 e− 2T τ(nH)2 .
Thus with probability at least 1− δ/2∣∣∣R̂EV − REV∣∣∣ ≤ nH√ log(4/δ)
2T
.
Combining this result with the result of Lemma 10, we find that with probability at least 1− δ
|µ̂− µ| ≤ O˜
(
nmax{L,H}
√
H log(n/δ)
T
)
.
Let ρ̂ = µ̂
(
1− e−µ̂)−1. Since the function f(x) = x/(1− e−x) is Lipschitz we can conclude that
|ρ̂− ρ| ≤ O˜
(
nmax{L,H}
√
H log(n/δ)
T
)
with probability at least 1− δ
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